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I. INTRODUCTION
With the aftertaste of World War II fresh in its mouth, the newly
formed United Nations (U.N.) drafted its Charter to provide some degree
of trust and security within the international community.2 The ultimate
goal was to prevent another world war? However, the modem-day threat
* J.D., 2001, University of Florida Levin College of Law. This work received the award
for Best Comment for Spring 1999. 1 wish to express my deepest gratitude to John Gregory without
whose friendship and dedication this Comment would not have published. I also wish to thank Dr.
Karen Larkey for her invaluable words of wisdom and inspiration that served as a catalyst for this
work. Special thanks to Professor Berta Hernandez-Truyol who introduced me to the field of
International Law. Finally, I want to extend my warmest appreciation to Joshua Corn, Wendy S.
Cramer, Ricka Gen, Duane L. Pinnock, Stacy A. Prince, Christine Thomas and Michelle Thresher
for giving their support when it was needed most.
1. Kofi Annan, Address to the UNESCO Ceremony Marking the 50th Anniversary of the
Universal Declarationof Human Rights, Paris, December 1998 SG/SM/6825.
2. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. The first sentence of the Preamble begins, "We the peoples of
the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind. . ." and continues with a pledge "to
practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our
strength to maintain international peace and security ..... Id.; see also Rajendra Ramlogan,
Towards a New Vision of WorldSecurity: The United Nations Security Counciland the Lessons of
Somalia, 16 Hous. J.INT'L L. 213,224 n.66 (1993) (noting that similar events inspired the creation
of the League of Nations which was replaced by the United Nations when it failed to prevent World
War II, the ultimate breach of international peace and security).
3. See A. Peter Mutharika, The Role of the United Nations Security Council in African
Peace Management:Some Proposals,17 MICH J.INT'L L. 537,537 (1996); see generallyJames W.
Houck, The Command and Controlof United Nations Forces in the Era of "Peace Enforcement,"
4 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1 (1993).
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to international peace comes in the form of internal disputes rather than the
cross-border conflicts envisioned by the Framers.4
With increasing entry into the domestic arena, it appears that the U.N.
may be spreading itself too thin.5 Numerous civil conflicts are currently
gripping the international community, making it unrealistic that the U.N.
will have either the mandate or the resources to deal with them all.6 The
U.N. must develop a clear and consistent set of criteria to evaluate
successfully the appropriateness of initiating and terminating
interventions. Otherwise its continued existence, as an impartial voice of
the international community, will be short-lived. It is this writer's intention
to demonstrate that the Security Council has taken an inconsistent stand
vis-6i-vis determinations for intervention into a state's domestic disputes.
This comment will attempt to define a set of criteria that the Council7 can
use in assessing the value of U.N. intervention when a State is involved in
an internal dispute. New civil conflicts are breaking out almost daily,
raising complex questions that cannot be answered merely by utilizing
outdated guidelines that fail to consider modem issues.
This comment will explore the emerging arena of international
intervention in the context of humanitarian law. Part II of this comment
will explain the legal basis for U.N. intervention. Part III will use the
situation in Somalia to illustrate the complexities of humanitarian
intervention. Part IV will discuss suggestions for new criteria to be used
for intervention when intra-state conflicts arise. This comment concludes
with predictions for the future of humanitarian intervention in civil
disputes.

4. See Mutharika, supra note 3, at 538 (pointing out the almost unanimous agreement in
support of redefining the goals of the U.N. Council to better reflect the changing dimensions of
threats to global peace).
5. See Ravi Mahalingam, The Compatibility of the Principleof Nonintervention with the
Right of HumanitarianIntervention, I UCLA J.INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 221, 252 (1996).
6. See Shibley Telhami, Is a Standing United Nations Army Possible? Or Desirable?,28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 673, 674 (1995); see also John Seaman, The International System of
Humanitarian Relief in the "New World Order," in THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 1, 1-2 (John Harriss ed., 1995) (noting that records show there have been seventynine intra-state wars between 1989 and 1992 and during that same time period, only three crossboundary wars).
7. See T. Weiss et al., The United Nationsand ChangingWorldPolitics,in INTERNATIONAL
LAW 1223,1223-24 (Barry Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1999). The Security Council (Council)
is the U.N. body with the power to make binding resolutions on the settlement of disputes. This
powerful U.N. body can compel U.N. Members to join together to restore international peace and
security. See id. The Council can use its discretion to decide what is an international threat and
what is merely an internal dispute. See id.
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II. THE LEGAL BASIS FOR INTERVENTION

When the U.N. Security Council is alerted to the existence of a threat
to international peace, it must take action to eliminate that threat or risk
international war.' Global peace relies on nonintervention and mutual
respect for state sovereignty. 9 Thus, U.N. military intervention is usually
used only as a last resort in restoring world peace because it tramples on
these correlative rights. Even so, members of the U.N. have strongly
opposed any limitation on their sovereignty, so that the United Nation's
use of military intervention, one of the most significant intrusions on a
State's territorial integrity, continues to be controversial.
Although the concept of intervention remains suspect among the
international community, it has been approved in limited circumstances.
For example, a state's right to use force to defend itself from attack on its
"territorial integrity" or "political independence"'0 is a justifiable
limitation of absolute sovereignty. In addition, the Security Council may
authorize force" to impede anything it views as a "threat to peace, breach
of the peace, or act of aggression."' 12 In other words, a state that has
breached its agreement as a signatory to the U.N. Charter by invading
another state's domestic jurisdiction
forfeits its right as a sovereign to be
3
free from U.N. intervention.
Despite a consensus among the international community that a state's
breach of the peace warrants intervention, states have disagreed over
which acts constitute a breach. The Charter's language is intentionally
vague and ambiguous to allow the Security Council broad discretion in
making the determination that a threat to or breach of the peace exists. 4

8. See Earl Sullivan, The United Nations: Dealing with Threats to the Peace in the PostCold War Era, in MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY AND THE UNITED NATIONS TODAY 44,44 (James P.

Muldoon Jr. et al. eds., 1999); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 39. This article states in full, "the
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id.
9. See FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND
MORALITY 127-30 (1950). The interpretations of this article of the Charter vary and Tes6n writes

that "it is a distortion to argue that humanitarian intervention is prohibited by article 2(4)." Id. at
131.

10. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
11. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42.

12. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
13. See U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Note that when a state gives its consent for outside
intervention, the intervention is not a violation of the U.N. charter and self-defense is not justified.

See id. A state violates the U.N. Charter provisions if it does not get the target state's consent or
approval from the Council before it interferes in a state's domestic jurisdiction. See id.
14. See L. Henkin, Use of Force:Law and U.S. Policy: Right v. Might, in INTERNATIONAL
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While there is little debate that an armed dispute between two or more
states qualifies as an international threat, frequently the situation is more
complex where only one side is involved, and an international dispute is
not as easily distinguishable from a domestic dispute. For instance, what
happens when a state is engaged in civil war? The U.N. Charter expressly
prohibits intervention in "matters essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State," yet the Security Council has authorized
intervention in civil conflicts when human rights were at stake."
Since neither revolution nor civil war is prohibited by international
law, 6 the international community may not intervene for these reasons
alone. However, states may argue intervention is warranted based on the
assumption that even internal insurrection will eventually threaten world
peace. These arguments supporting U.N. intervention because of the
international effects of civil wars come in two forms. First, the existence
of egregious human rights violations commonly associated with civil wars
precludes international peace and security.' 7 Second, neighboring countries
may be burdened with masses of refugees fleeing the warring state thereby
causing international instability." These arguments broadly construe the
language of the Charter to authorize intervention for almost any type of
conflict, even if it involves the human rights of individuals. Furthermore,
most states only argue for intervention when it would not result in the
placement of troops on their own soil.
A target state's consent may provide the nexus from internal dispute to
intervention. 9 When consent is given, the U.N. action is not characterized
by the term "intervention" because intervention denotes unwanted
interference rather than approval from the target state.2 ° However, consent
is not always freely given, and the Security Council must decide on an ad
hoc basis whether the need for intervention outweighs respect for state
sovereignty.
1166,1167-73 (Barry Carter& Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1999) (explaining that the use of force
has been expressly condemned by almost every State, but listing some exceptions to
nonintervention such as self-defense, humanitarian intervention, and restoring self-determination
after colonial rule, that have received varying support from the international community).
15. Mahalingam, supra note 5, at 245.
16. One of the contributing factors to the U.N.'s slow reaction to the genocide inRwanda was
the U.N. Charter's lack of guidelines for dealing in civil conflicts. See Kimberly D. Barnes,
LAW

International Law, The United Nations, and Intervention in Civil Conflicts, 19 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 117, 144 (1995); see also Mutharika, supra note 3, at 562 (reasoning that

intervention requires infringing upon Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter to save "failed" or "failing"
States such as Somalia and Rwanda).
17. See Martin Griffiths et al., Sovereignty andSuffering, in THEPOLITICSOF HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION 33, 37 (John Harriss ed., 1995).
18. See Kumar Rupesinghe, Civil Wars, Civil Peace 50 (PLuTO PRESS 1998).
19. See Griffiths et al., supra note 17, at 40.
20. See id.
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As a result of this stalemate among U.N. members when the target state
withholds its consent, the Security Council has been reluctant to expand
its interpretation of "threats" to international peace to allow intervention
in a state's domestic affairs for purely humanitarian reasons. 21 This
reluctance is evidenced by the Security Council's attempt to focus
attention on the significant impact disputes, seemingly domestic in nature,
may have on the stability of surrounding states.22 Thus, it seems that
intervention is less controversial when it has even minimal impact on the
international community than when it only affects those within the state.
Nonetheless, the Security Council increasingly has become involved with
crises that have no clear impact on surrounding states.23
As the section that follows will detail, the intervention in Somalia is a
prime example of an intra-state humanitarian crisis with only minimal
effect on neighboring regions.24 Therefore, the Security Council's
authorization of intervention in Somalia may have set a precedent for
future Security Council resolutions authorizing intervention in civil
disputes. This is a critical time for the Security Council to define its
position regarding the presumption of nonintervention in a state's internal
affairs." The Security Council has the power to make new law by
interpreting Article 2(4) broadly, or adhering to traditional concepts of
threats to international peace and security that limit U.N. intervention.
Much has been written about the actions taken in compliance with,
Security Council decisions; however, noticeably absent from the literature
is the actual criteria the Security Council utilizes in making its
determinations.26

21. But see Thomas G. Weiss, Rekindling Hope in UN HumanitarianIntervention, in
LEARNING FROM SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

207, 209

(Walter Clarke & Jeffery Herbst eds., 1997) (arguing that the Council continues to expand its
definition of "threat" to international peace "to cover virtually any subject").
22. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 1179 (Barry Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1999). But see
Ruth E. Gordon, HumanitarianIntervention by the UnitedNations: Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti, 31
TEX. INT'L LJ. 43,48 (stating that the concept of international peace and security must be expanded
because, in reality, there are internal conflicts within states that do not effect neighboring states in
any significant way).
23. See Gordon,supranote 22, at 51 (explaining the possibility of international ramifications
did exist but was not the Council's primary concern).
24. See id.
25. See Ramlogan, supra note 2, at 224-25.
26. The United States, as a permanent member of the Council, determines whether the U.N.
should intervene by answering the following questions. The first question asks whether the situation
is a threat to international peace and security, see Colonel James P. Terry, The Criteria For
Intervention:An Evaluationof US. MilitaryPolicy in UN. Operations,31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 101, 104

(1996), but does not address how the United States determines whether a threat exists. But see
Patricia Y. Reyhan, Genocidal Violence in Burundi:Should InternationalLaw ProhibitDomestic

HumanitarianIntervention, 60 ALB. L. REv. 771,787 (1997) (describing methods for evaluating
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III. SOMALIA: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The U.N. intervention in Somalia is significant because it marks the
first time in U.N. history that the Security Council authorized the use of
force for exclusively humanitarian reasons. 2' However, the precedential
value of this intervention may be limited by the uniqueness of the Somali
situation.28 In order to proceed with the analysis of U.N. norms regarding
humanitarian intervention, the specific facts of the Somalia situation must
be explained.
The current crisis in Somalia began in 1989, when the United States cut
off its substantial economic support to the country rendering the
government incapable of providing much assistance for its citizens.29
Without the financial assistance upon which Somalia was dependent,
President Siad Barre's power was greatly diminished and he was ousted
from office in 1991 by clan-based opposition groups.3 ° Both the lack of
U.S. financial support and the battle for presidential power created an
environment of chaos, hopelessness, and hatred.3 The resources Somalia
did scrape together were used to fuel the political struggle instead of
distributing food to the Somali population at-large.32 One year after
Barre's ouster, the country had been destroyed by widespread famine and
tribal warfare leaving thousands of people dead.33

humanitarian intervention, specifically when genocide is at issue, in three categories: substantive,
procedural, and preferential).
27. See Ramlogan, supra note 2, at 245; see also Hugo Slim & Emma Visman, Evacuation,
Interventionand Retaliation:UnitedNationsHumanitarianOperationsin Somalia, 1991-1993, in
THE POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 145 (John Harriss ed. 1995) (describing Somalia
as "a laboratory for the new world order" where policy-makers can "invent new models of conflict
resolution, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding").
28. See Ion Lewis & James Mayall, Somalia. in THE NEW INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994:
UNITED NATIONS EXPERIENCE INCAMBODIA, FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND SOMALIA 94,109 (James
Mayall ed., 1996).
29. See Mike Blakely, Somalia, in THE COST OF CONFLICT: PREVENTION AND CURE IN THE
GLOBAL ARENA 75, 76 (Michael E. Brown & Richard N. Rosecrance eds., 1999) (noting that only
two years prior to its withdrawal of financial assistance, the U.S. had donated $100 million in
economic aid to Somalia).
30. Id. at 79.
31. See id. at 106 (explaining the division along clan lines which quickly led to a "bloodbath"
that left over 14,000 people dead in 1992).
32. See id. at 76-77. The author suggest that "[b]y simply continuing the relatively small
amount of aid and changing its character from military support to sustainable economic
development aid, the international community could have at least maintained the status quo and
averted a humanitarian and financial disaster." U.S aid to Somalia averaged $20-$50 million dollars
per year - a mere pittance by Western standards. See id. at 76.
33. See id. at 80. Other signs of destruction included the Somali government's failure to
provide electricity, fuel, sanitation, medical supplies, and plant equipment. See id.
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Despite the humanitarian crisis in Somalia, the U.N. did not intervene
immediately.34 Instead, it demanded that warring clans come to a peaceful
settlement in order to receive U.N. humanitarian assistance for the Somali
people. 5 Unfortunately, the method and goals of the intervention were
poorly planned.36 The international community deemed Somalia "do' and thus, did not spend much time formulating a plan or trying to
able"37
understand the complexities of a land without a central government where
dozens of tribes were fighting for recognition from foreign nations. 3 The
absence of a functioning government in Somalia enabled the Security
Council to circumvent traditional legal boundaries associated with State
sovereignty.39 In response to the crisis, the Security Council authorized
U.N. troops to diffuse the clan warfare and aid food distribution. 40 Thus,
U.N. troops were deployed in the midst of an age-old war4 with orders to
maintain a nonexistent peace.42
Today, despite earlier U.N. intervention the situation in Somalia is
similar to its conditions in 1992.43 Human rights abuses continue to
pervade Somali life.44 Curiously, the Security Council has not considered
intervention as an option for diffusing the current warfare in Somalia,
34. See Slim & Visman, supra note 27, at 154; see also.Lewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at
108.
35. See Slim & Visman, supra note 27, at 154.
36. See lOAN LEWIS, Making History in Somalia: HumanitarianIntervention in a Stateless
Society 16 (1993).
37. See Slim & Visman, supra note 27, at 157.
38. See id. at 147, 155.
39. See Gordon, supra note 22, at 50.
40. See Slim & Visman, supra note 27, at 155-56. The U.S. led this U.N. mission and took
the liberty of calling it "Operation Restore Hope," in an effort to reflect favorably on President
George Bush before he left office. See id.
41. See Lewis & Mayall, supra note 28, at 101. Even before European colonization, the
Somali people separated themselves according to tribal lineage and fought each other for land and
water. See id. This Bedouin Arab maxim captures the essence of the Somali ideology: "Myself
against my brother; my brother and I against my cousins; my cousins and I against the world." Id.
42. See John Drysdale, Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia, in LEARNING FROM
SOMALIA: THE LESSONS OF ARMED HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 118, 126-27 (Walter Clarke and
Jeffrey Herbst eds., 1997). Although force was authorized to restore a "secure environment" by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 794, the military action was labeled a "peacemaking
intervention." See id. at 127; see also UNSCR 794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (declaring the situation in
Somalia "intolerable" and authorizing U.N. troops to use force if necessary to "create a secure
environment").
43. See Amnesty Int'l Ann. Rep., 1999. Despite their failure to "create a secure
environment," U.N. forces withdrew in 1994, leaving Somalia just as it had been before their
arrival, if not worse with the addition of two more years of destruction and fighting; see also Nii
Lante Wallace-Bruce, Taiwan andSomalia:InternationalLegal Curiosities,22 QUEEN'S L.J. 453,
478 (1997) (predicting that the status of Somalia will lead the way to being the first State to lose
its statehood due to its continuous failure to establish a central government).
44. See Amnesty, supra note 43.
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despite the pleas of world leaders.45 The U.N.'s involvement in Somalia
raises many significant questions. First, can sovereignty be overlooked
when the target state lacks a central government? Second, should all
human rights violations constitute a threat to international peace and
security? Third, will the Security Council limit future humanitarian
intervention to the uniqueness of the Somalia situation? Finally, why
would the same crisis that was worthy of international attention in 1992 be
ignored today? The Security Council must answer the questions its
involvement in Somalia has raised.
IV. A MODERN

APPROACH TO INTERVENTION

The monumental question regarding humanitarian intervention is
whether the abuse of human rights mandates or permits U.N.
involvement.4 6 If the Charter mandates intervention when human rights are
at stake, the term "human right" must be carefully defined in order to
determine when a violation has occurred. Under this approach,
intervention will be compulsory when one of the enumerated rights are
violated.47 However, this compulsory system has the potential for disaster
if states are motivated to act based on their own self-interest48 rather than
45. Press Release, SecurityCouncil HearsSpeakers on Secretary General's 1998 Reporton
Africa, SC/6736 (Sept. 30, 1999) (expressing concern for the U.N.'s lackluster response to conflicts
in Africa).
46. The concept of human rights denotes a certain level of moral obligation. The international
community has finally recognized the significance of these rights. In fact, anticipatory breaches of
human rights are being considered as calls for intervention. See Yogesh K. Tyagi, The Concept of
Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 883, 886-87 (1995).
47. Based on this premise, for example, the United States' use of the death penalty as a form
of punishment could qualify as a violation of human rights warranting U.N. intervention because
other states have condemned this practice. However, a problem arises with this concept when one
considers the reality of the U.N. structure and operation. Because the U.S. is a permanent member
of the Council, it has veto power with respect to any proposed Council action. Thus, it would likely
veto any proposal forU.N. intervention in the United States. Similarly, the otherfour countries with
veto power, France, Great Britain, China, and Russia would likely veto any proposal for U.N.
intervention in their own territory. See U.N. CHARTER art. 23, paras. 1-2; see also Mutharika, supra
note 3, at 555 (commenting that it is unlikely the Council would relinquish any of its power by
spreading the veto power among a larger representation of U.N. Members, as has been proposed).
However, the concept of universal human rights might make states morally bound to intervene
regardless of Council approval. Thus, the United States' veto of a proposal for U.N. intervention
in its domestic jurisdiction would be meaningless if states were morally obligated to end the death
penalty practice.
48. Ideally, Member States participating in an intervention via U.N. forces receive full
support from their citizens who will eagerly offer their services to save victims of human rights
abuses and risk their lives in the process. In reality, it is unlikely any state would be willing to risk
its own people solely to improve the lives of another state's citizens. States may view intervention
in different ways. For example, "conflict minimalists" are goal oriented and value sovereignty and
nonintervention above human rights. See Byron F. Burmester, On HumanitarianIntervention: The
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Alternatively, if the Security Council's regulation of human rights
abuses is discretionary rather than compulsory, a hierarchy of violations
must be established.5" There are numerous human rights and not all
violations warrant the use of force by U.N. outsiders.5 Therefore, it is
imperative that there exist a clearly defined method for distinguishing
between crises that require the use of U.N. collective force and crises that
would be best served by other international organizations such as
UNICEF. 2 This consistency is the only way future violations will be
deterred and peace will be achieved.
IV. CONCLUSION

Recent crises in East Timor, 3 Chechnya,54 and Pakistan" illustrate the
need for a system of clear, definitive criteria to address a variety of
situations across the globe. The U.N.'s haphazard approach to intervention
hasjeopardized its future as a credible organization. Thus far, the U.N. has
not been extremely successful in its endeavors, as the current state of
Somalia indicates. This failure may be due to unrealistic goals, undefined
priorities, and an inconsistent method of determining when intervention is
New World Orderand Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 269,280. "Conditionalists" view humanitarian intervention as a right, while "realists" see it as a moral obligation. See
id.
49. See id; see also Telhami, supra note 6, at 677-78 (recognizing that the United States
intervenes in locations where it has interests to protect and not just everywhere human rights are
being violated).
50. See Nikolai Krylov, HumanitarianIntervention: Prosand Cons, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COmp.L.J. 365, 391 (1995).
51. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights lists the right not
to be hungry as a universal human right. InternationalCovenant on Economic, Socialand Cultural
Rights 993 U.N.T.S. 3, (1966) art. 11, para. 2.
52. The United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund ("UNICEF") was described
as one of the two "most indisputably effective and important instruments of direct assistance...
[t]heir achievements alone would support the claim that, with all its institutional constraints, the
United Nations has managed to play an important role in the defense of human rights." Tom J.
Farer, The United Nations and Human Rights: More Than a Whimper, Less Than a Roar, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY: ISSUES AND ACTION 194, 197-98 (Richard Pierre
Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989).
53. See Seth Mydans, Peacekeepersin East Timor Kill 3 Gunmen in a Firefight,N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1999, at Al (using a recent attack on U.N. troops in East Timor to illustrate the dangers
of peacekeeping).
54. See Carlotta Gall, FightingIntensifiesas ChechensResist RussianAdvance, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. I1,1999, at Al (speculating that the violent conflict with Russian troops in Chechnya is far
from over).
55. See Tim Weiner, PakistanMilitary Completes Seizure ofGovernment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1999, at Al (describing the Pakistani army's non-violent government takeover and the United
States' disapproval).
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necessary to uphold the principles of the U.N. Charter. The U.N. tends to
intervene, assuming that it can solve conflicts, despite a lack of clear and
concise understanding of the complexities that have characterized civil
conflicts.
Humanitarian intervention has expanded the scope of collective
intervention, and in a sense, destroyed the ultimate goal of avoiding war
at all costs. Although famine, disease and other humanitarian concerns
threaten international peace, the use of force, for these reasons, is
unwarranted. It is not this writer's intention to advocate the abandonment
of people in need. However, feeding them a mouth full of false hopes is
also unacceptable. The international community, as a whole, needs
something in which to believe, whether it be the certainty that aggressors
are punished for crimes against humanity or populations are saved from
the brutality of not having basic needs met. The nations that carry the
burden of safeguarding the world must also have clear, reasonable
guidelines with which to work so they do not feel overwhelmed in their
task.
While the statement by Secretary General Kofi Annan quoted in the
beginning of this comment is what the U.N. should aspire to do, it may be
impractical to send U.N. troops every time a human right is violated. The
U.N. simply lacks the resources to rescue all people all of the time. A more
realistic goal such as swift response to the most egregious human rights
violations and punishment of those who abuse these rights should be
considered. The U.N. must set out priorities in this area before it loses all
credibility as an organization capable of protecting the peace. When states
begin to lose faith in the system, they will no longer adhere to the rules on
which the system is based. Without a universal system holding states
together for a common goal, the result will be similar to the anarchical
state and clan warfare that characterizes Somalia today. Except here, there
will be no one to intervene. The world is in a state of emergency.
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